Andrew Lawton, Elgin—St. Thomas—London South
“I want the House to split the vote on this bill in two. It deals with two separate issues: stopping assisted dying for people with mental illness, and allowing people to request assisted dying in advance before they lose the ability to consent. These are different moral questions, and members should be allowed to vote on each one separately.”
“Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order to request the division of Bill C-41 for voting purposes, pursuant to Standing Order 69.1. Standing Order 69.1(1) says the following: In the case where a government bill seeks to repeal, amend or enact more than one act, and where there is not a common element connecting the various provisions or where unrelated matters are linked, the Speaker shall have the power to divide the questions, for the purposes of voting, on the motion for second reading and reference to a committee and the motion for third reading and passage of the bill. The Speaker shall have the power to combine clauses of the bill thematically and to put the aforementioned questions on each of these groups of clauses separately, provided that there will be a single debate at each stage. Bill C-41 seeks to do two fundamental things. That is to say, the bill stands for two separate principles. The bill seeks to stop the forthcoming expansion of medical assistance in dying to people whose sole underlying condition is a mental illness. It also seeks to allow medical assistance in dying for people who have no capacity to consent but who requested MAID before they lost capacity, otherwise known as advance requests. These are two fundamentally different questions that must, I submit, be voted on separately. The bill, as worded, would also fundamentally change the nature of the MAID regime by partially removing it from the realm of criminal law insofar as advance requests are concerned. This is another matter that speaks to both the complexity of the bill and its omnibus nature, which I believe warrants your prerogative to divide the question pursuant to Standing Order 69.1. Based on my preliminary reading of the bill, there should be two separate questions: one on the mental health expansion in clauses 9, 10 and 14, which concern a statute passed in 2021, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying), as amended in 2023 and 2024, together with subclause 4(2) of Bill C-41 on the same subject matter; and the second question on MAID for people who cannot consent, otherwise known as advance requests, in the remaining provisions of Bill C-41, which propose amendments to a different act, the Criminal Code, plus consequential cross-references in three other statutes. I recognize that these matters concern medical assistance in dying. However, the question under Standing Order 69.1 is not simply whether the provisions fall within the same broad policy area, but rather, whether they are sufficiently distinct so as to warrant separate votes. Speaker Regan addressed this contrast in a bill containing multiple principles while addressing a singular field of policy in his March 1, 2018, ruling at page 17551 of the Debates. He stated: In presenting arguments relating to Bill C-63, the hon. member for Calgary Shepard raised an interesting concept from the practice in the Quebec National Assembly. Quoting from page 400 of Parliamentary Procedure in Québec, he stated: “The principle or principles contained in a bill must not be confused with the field it concerns. To frame the concept of principle in that way would prevent the division of most bills, because they apply to a specific field.” While their procedure for dividing bills is quite different from ours, the idea of distinguishing the principles of a bill from its field has stayed with me. While each bill is different and so too each case, I believe that Standing Order 69.1 can indeed be applied to a bill where all of the initiatives relate to a specific policy area, if those initiatives are sufficiently distinct to warrant a separate decision of the House. To that end, Mr. Speaker, I submit that you should approach Bill C-41, legislation which quite literally concerns life and death, in a fundamentally different way from how you might consider a request to, say, separate a transportation bill with respect to its rail clauses and its aviation clauses. Stopping the expansion of MAID to people with mental illness was the subject of Bill C-218, which the Liberal government voted against earlier this session, citing an intention to bring forward the legislation it tabled yesterday, Bill C-41. In the absence of legislation, this expansion will go into effect March 17, 2027. You will recall, Mr. Speaker, that this deadline has been twice delayed by the Liberals, citing the need for further study and further readiness. In this Parliament, the Special Joint Committee on Medical Assistance in Dying was re-established, with the narrow mandate of exploring the forthcoming mental illness expansion. The culmination of the study was a singular recommendation, supported by Liberal and Conservative members of the committee, that the expansion not proceed. This was an incredibly important act of bipartisan co-operation on what, I reiterate, is a life-and-death matter. This work underscores the importance of allowing parliamentarians to consider the mental health expansion of MAID on its own merit rather than marrying it to the separate and also consequential question about advance requests. During the course of the committee’s hearings, we heard from many experts, including MAID practitioners, who oppose MAID for people with mental illness but support MAID itself. There are those who support MAID for people with mental illness but not MAID for people without the capacity to consent, just as the inverse is undoubtedly true. On these questions of conscience, members should be free to vote individually on each of these two distinct questions. In approaching the exercise of your authority under Standing Order 69.1, Mr. Speaker, I would encourage you to draw inspiration from the way in which the Chair uses its discretion on the selection of report stage amendments when a matter of conscience comes before the House. While on most bills, the criteria are applied in a clinical manner, the Chair will, on matters of conscience, approach the exercise in a more generous fashion. Two such cases concern earlier iterations of medical assistance in dying legislation. On the original MAID bill, Bill C-14, Mr. Speaker Regan said, at page 3485 of the Debates on May 17, 2016: The Chair appreciates the arguments put forward by hon. members as to why they consider these amendments to be of such significance as to warrant further consideration at report stage. I recognize that this is an important issue on which many members have strong and varied opinions. The Chair notes that the bill before us is unique, in its far-reaching social, moral and constitutional implications. The Chair also notes that, given the variety of opinions expressed by various members in all parties in relation to the provisions of this once-in-a-generation bill, the Chair is open to the argument of exceptional significance as contemplated in our Standing Orders. For these reasons, the Chair is prepared, on this occasion, to give members the benefit of the doubt.... Similar views were expressed concerning the later Bill C-7, by the Assistant Deputy Speaker, on November 27, 2020, at page 2603 of the Debates: As with the original medical assistance in dying legislation four years ago, I recognize that this is an important issue with profound legal, moral and constitutional dimensions and that members have strongly held and varied points of view on these matters. For these reasons, the Chair is prepared on this occasion to give members the benefit of the doubt.... To return to the threshold for dividing votes set out in the relevant standing order, I submit here that there is a sound basis for you to find that, despite the common element between the key questions involving MAID itself, the measures are fundamentally distinct from one another, with separate political, moral and legal implications, and for that matter, distinct levels of support and opposition among Canadians and, I suspect, Parliamentarians as well. In closing, the disparate objectives of Bill C-41 warrant your prerogative as Chair to divide the question for the purposes of voting.”
Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order to request the division of Bill C-41 for voting purposes, pursuant to Standing Order 69.1. Standing Order 69.1(1) says the following: In the case where a government bill seeks to repeal, amend or enact more than one act, and where there is not a common element connecting the various provisions or where unrelated matters are linked, the Speaker shall have the power to divide the questions, for the purposes of voting, on the motion for second reading and reference to a committee and the motion for third reading and passage of the bill. The Speaker shall have the power to combine clauses of the bill thematically and to put the aforementioned questions on each of these groups of clauses separately, provided that there will be a single debate at each stage. Bill C-41 seeks to do two fundamental things. That is to say, the bill stands for two separate principles. The bill seeks to stop the forthcoming expansion of medical assistance in dying to people whose sole underlying condition is a mental illness. It also seeks to allow medical assistance in dying for people who have no capacity to consent but who requested MAID before they lost capacity, otherwise known as advance requests. These are two fundamentally different questions that must, I submit, be voted on separately. The bill, as worded, would also fundamentally change the nature of the MAID regime by partially removing it from the realm of criminal law insofar as advance requests are concerned. This is another matter that speaks to both the complexity of the bill and its omnibus nature, which I believe warrants your prerogative to divide the question pursuant to Standing Order 69.1. Based on my preliminary reading of the bill, there should be two separate questions: one on the mental health expansion in clauses 9, 10 and 14, which concern a statute passed in 2021, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying), as amended in 2023 and 2024, together with subclause 4(2) of Bill C-41 on the same subject matter; and the second question on MAID for people who cannot consent, otherwise known as advance requests, in the remaining provisions of Bill C-41, which propose amendments to a different act, the Criminal Code, plus consequential cross-references in three other statutes. I recognize that these matters concern medical assistance in dying. However, the question under Standing Order 69.1 is not simply whether the provisions fall within the same broad policy area, but rather, whether they are sufficiently distinct so as to warrant separate votes. Speaker Regan addressed this contrast in a bill containing multiple principles while addressing a singular field of policy in his March 1, 2018, ruling at page 17551 of the Debates. He stated: In presenting arguments relating to Bill C-63, the hon. member for Calgary Shepard raised an interesting concept from the practice in the Quebec National Assembly. Quoting from page 400 of Parliamentary Procedure in Québec, he stated: “The principle or principles contained in a bill must not be confused with the field it concerns. To frame the concept of principle in that way would prevent the division of most bills, because they apply to a specific field.” While their procedure for dividing bills is quite different from ours, the idea of distinguishing the principles of a bill from its field has stayed with me. While each bill is different and so too each case, I believe that Standing Order 69.1 can indeed be applied to a bill where all of the initiatives relate to a specific policy area, if those initiatives are sufficiently distinct to warrant a separate decision of the House. To that end, Mr. Speaker, I submit that you should approach Bill C-41, legislation which quite literally concerns life and death, in a fundamentally different way from how you might consider a request to, say, separate a transportation bill with respect to its rail clauses and its aviation clauses. Stopping the expansion of MAID to people with mental illness was the subject of Bill C-218, which the Liberal government voted against earlier this session, citing an intention to bring forward the legislation it tabled yesterday, Bill C-41. In the absence of legislation, this expansion will go into effect March 17, 2027. You will recall, Mr. Speaker, that this deadline has been twice delayed by the Liberals, citing the need for further study and further readiness. In this Parliament, the Special Joint Committee on Medical Assistance in Dying was re-established, with the narrow mandate of exploring the forthcoming mental illness expansion. The culmination of the study was a singular recommendation, supported by Liberal and Conservative members of the committee, that the expansion not proceed. This was an incredibly important act of bipartisan co-operation on what, I reiterate, is a life-and-death matter. This work underscores the importance of allowing parliamentarians to consider the mental health expansion of MAID on its own merit rather than marrying it to the separate and also consequential question about advance requests. During the course of the committee’s hearings, we heard from many experts, including MAID practitioners, who oppose MAID for people with mental illness but support MAID itself. There are those who support MAID for people with mental illness but not MAID for people without the capacity to consent, just as the inverse is undoubtedly true. On these questions of conscience, members should be free to vote individually on each of these two distinct questions. In approaching the exercise of your authority under Standing Order 69.1, Mr. Speaker, I would encourage you to draw inspiration from the way in which the Chair uses its discretion on the selection of report stage amendments when a matter of conscience comes before the House. While on most bills, the criteria are applied in a clinical manner, the Chair will, on matters of conscience, approach the exercise in a more generous fashion. Two such cases concern earlier iterations of medical assistance in dying legislation. On the original MAID bill, Bill C-14, Mr. Speaker Regan said, at page 3485 of the Debates on May 17, 2016: The Chair appreciates the arguments put forward by hon. members as to why they consider these amendments to be of such significance as to warrant further consideration at report stage. I recognize that this is an important issue on which many members have strong and varied opinions. The Chair notes that the bill before us is unique, in its far-reaching social, moral and constitutional implications. The Chair also notes that, given the variety of opinions expressed by various members in all parties in relation to the provisions of this once-in-a-generation bill, the Chair is open to the argument of exceptional significance as contemplated in our Standing Orders. For these reasons, the Chair is prepared, on this occasion, to give members the benefit of the doubt.... Similar views were expressed concerning the later Bill C-7, by the Assistant Deputy Speaker, on November 27, 2020, at page 2603 of the Debates: As with the original medical assistance in dying legislation four years ago, I recognize that this is an important issue with profound legal, moral and constitutional dimensions and that members have strongly held and varied points of view on these matters. For these reasons, the Chair is prepared on this occasion to give members the benefit of the doubt.... To return to the threshold for dividing votes set out in the relevant standing order, I submit here that there is a sound basis for you to find that, despite the common element between the key questions involving MAID itself, the measures are fundamentally distinct from one another, with separate political, moral and legal implications, and for that matter, distinct levels of support and opposition among Canadians and, I suspect, Parliamentarians as well. In closing, the disparate objectives of Bill C-41 warrant your prerogative as Chair to divide the question for the purposes of voting.