Official Hansard
Mr. Speaker, these are only a few examples of how the government creates these big blocks of money without any accountability or transparency. What is the point of scrutiny when the Liberals are just going to turn a blind eye again and again to mismanagement? This is one of the most dangerous things Parliament can do: grant billions of dollars without any metrics of success, without any capacity to see how the money is being used. This is not the way our democracy or public accountability is supposed to work. When we hear promises of new spending, new funds, new programs and new announcements, I am required to ask, will it be any different this time? In my riding of Mission—Matsqui—Abbotsford, these failures are not theoretical. They touch very close to home. In 2021, we experienced massive flooding that became one of the most expensive natural disasters in Canada. Later that year, Lytton, British Columbia, in my riding, was burned to the ground. No riding in Canada has ever faced devastation like Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon did in 2021. The CN Rail line was washed out throughout the province. The CP Rail line was washed out all across the province. The Trans-Canada Highway was washed out and flooded. The Duffey, which connects Whistler and Pemberton to Lillooet, was washed out. The Lougheed Highway was washed out. The Southern Railway line was washed out. The port of metro Vancouver was completely shut off from the rest of Canada. We had to bring in military assistance from Quebec because there was no equipment cache in British Columbia to deal with the devastation we faced. The Sumas Prairie was flooded, compromising B.C.'s food supply. Homes were lost. People died. Our infrastructure failed. I remember walking up to the Sir John A. Macdonald Building. It was at the time when the senator from Saskatchewan was kicked out of the Conservative caucus for a while, when Erin O'Toole was our leader, and some journalist asked me, “What do you think about this?” I had just come from a meeting with Bill Blair, now the high commissioner to the U.K. I said, “I can't believe you're asking me this. British Columbia is cut off from the rest of Canada, the port of metro Vancouver can't move any goods, and you're asking me about a senator?” B.C. is often overlooked in this chamber. It is not an understood place. Since 2021, I have stood in this chamber and in committees and pleaded with ministers of housing and infrastructure to help British Columbia, to help our farmers and to help the government achieve its own objectives of doubling exports to Asia-Pacific markets. None of that can happen unless the government pays attention to my riding. Most members in this chamber do not know that 37% of the oil from Trans Mountain goes through the Sumas transfer station in my community to the United States. Without that money, the Government of Canada would be bankrupt. Most members do not know that the Enbridge expansion and the Huntingdon transfer station are right in my riding. Canada cannot function without Mission—Matsqui—Abbotsford. My riding has one of the highest farm gates in all of Canada, and we are a key producer of berries, poultry, dairy and vegetables, on less than 1% of the land in B.C. We are an agricultural powerhouse, and we are also the confluence of the Trans Mountain pipeline, the Enbridge pipeline, the Trans‑Canada Highway, all three major rail lines in Canada, a border crossing and an international airport where the government just announced it is going to build Canada's new firefighting fleet through one of the best companies in Canada, Conair. There is so much happening in Mission—Matsqui—Abbotsford and in the Fraser Valley that is essential to what the government needs to do to complete its objectives. I ask the government when the dollars that Justin Trudeau promised at the photo ops in Abbotsford, in 2021, will come to fruition. I saw the high commissioner at the airport last week. I said, “Bill, I am still fighting.” He said to keep fighting, because they did not fulfill their promises to Mission—Matsqui—Abbotsford. My number one duty in the House is to get that member who spoke before me to come clean and support my community, to support Canada, to support our export objectives and to support renewed interest in supply chains. The Prime Minister went to New York and talked about looking to the future, about Canada's place in the global economy. We can agree that our future is not just a new trade agreement with the United States and Mexico. It is westbound, through British Columbia, because the next chapter of Canada's prosperity will be written in our relationships with the Asia‑Pacific markets, which are growing faster and demanding more food, more energy and a more reliable trading partner with expertise in engineering and services, with one of the most educated workforces in the entire world. We cannot do any of that if we do not take the $3.83 billion in national economic activity through agriculture in my riding, the role of our international airport, the site of our firefighting fleet, the Enbridge pipeline, the Trans Mountain pipeline, our international border crossing, the major arterial roads that connect British Columbia with all of Canada, our rail lines to the south, our rail lines to the port, and the breadbasket of British Columbia in my riding. Every container heading to Asia, every shipment of agricultural product and every export moving through our Pacific gateway depends on the strength and reliability of the supply chains in the Fraser Valley. If Canada wants to be a serious player in the Indo‑Pacific and if we want to seize the opportunities of growing global demand, we must ensure that our gateways work. I am going to repeat this time and time again. The government cannot accomplish its goal to double our exports abroad if it does not protect and maintain this critical infrastructure, not just on sunny days but in the face of floods, extreme weather and these growing infrastructure pressures. It is worth noting that our competitors are not standing still. Other countries are investing heavily in trade routes and in climate‑resilient infrastructure. We are seeing it in Washington state, where they are going to start exporting more potash and other goods that Canada has, because we are not moving fast enough. Canada has to do the same. The question before us is simple: Are we prepared to invest in the infrastructure that will define Canada's future, or are we willing to leave one of our most critical trade corridors vulnerable at the very moment the world is looking to Canada and the Pacific to provide some stability in light of global conflicts? The Fraser Valley is not just about the past. It is about the future that the Prime Minister spoke about in his remarks in New York. It is about a future where Canada can feed global markets, power economies with responsibly developed energy and strengthen its place as a reliable trading nation. Everything the Prime Minister wants to do happens in the Fraser Valley. However, to my key point, none of this is possible without resilient infrastructure, without protected corridors, without a federal government willing to act with urgency and ambition in a way it has not done yet. Yes, let us build homes, but let us also build the foundation of a country that can compete, that can trade and that can lead. When we invest in the Fraser Valley, it is not just about investing in a region. We are investing in Canada's future on the world stage. This is an odd bill. It was not in the budget, and it does not appear to be part of a coherent plan based on the information before the House today. It feels more like a last-minute talking point, so the Liberals can say that the Conservatives voted against housing, rather than a serious effort to address the legitimate things the minister is trying to solve. Canadians do want to see investment in housing and infrastructure, but they also want to see improved processes, because what I will outline in the coming hours will show that the Liberals have not done that to date. Before I do that, I would be remiss if I did not cover, just to reiterate the point, some of the comments that my constituents made in a recent mailer about what happened to them in the flood. Sometimes in this House, we need to bring in that personal perspective. These people matter, and they pay a lot of taxes. Their voice needs to be heard. I am going to refer to them just by their initials to protect their confidentiality. J. and T. wrote me and said the following: “Our family was seriously impacted when the dikes of Sumas River blew out in 2021. This flooded the Sumas Prairie where we live on a five-acre hay farm. We lost everything in our home. We had to rebuild the entire inside of the house, from floor to ceiling, including all appliances, windows, doors, furniture, flooring and personal items. We lost three vehicles, tools and equipment for the farm. Federal help is needed to deal with international disaster with the floodwaters.” This is a funny one. P. in Abbotsford wrote, “Instead of wasting time trying to get the Liberals to do something for the west coast, why not build a berm along the border? They can keep their water.” That is fair. D.S. wrote, “It appears to me the federal government is not taking the flooding issue seriously. Merritt, Princeton, Sumas Prairie, all their constituencies are not listened to by the Liberal government. Is it because they don't have their party's MPs in these ridings? Five hundred pages of reposting is not sufficient to approve funding for flood-stricken families? We pay equally into the tax system in Canada. Citizens should be first.” C. in Abbotsford wrote, “In 2021, our property flooded. We had a foot of water on the main floor of our house. We were displaced for six months from our home while we let it dry out. Gutted the main floor and renovated. We also have a barn, so animals, goats, horses and chickens, were relocated for a while. My husband has a landscaping business and his shop flooded, ruining equipment and storage areas. It has taken years to rebuild.” C. from Abbotsford wrote, “I was unable to get to my workplace during the floods. My church took the opportunity to help Ripples Estate with their restoration, and the devastation to their land was exceptional. In a documentary recap I filmed, one of the owners makes the comment that, 'We receive alert messages all the time on our iPhones. How is it possible that there is a failure to use this kind of method to warn about the potential weather impact of flooding?'” R. from Abbotsford wrote, “My wife with extreme Parkinson's and myself were evacuated for three weeks. We went to our son's in Calgary. I live in Sumas Prairie, where the dike broke. I helped move my neighbour as his barn flooded, as well as two homes past the bridge on Sumas River, which had to be replaced. My wife recently passed. This was an extremely difficult time. During the flood in 2025, I was stranded for three days, because all the roads around me were flooded. In this day and age, this problem must be resolved. Government, change. We need proper dyking in Sumas, Washington, and pump stations on Sumas River at Barrowtown.” N. and L. wrote, “Our family has lived on this property since 1957, which my father and mother moved to because of the high location of the property. They lived in a lower area when they migrated here in the 1930s. They went through the 1948 flood threat and realized the situation back then, so until November 2021, our family felt confident that we did not have to worry, but to our amazement the dyke on the Sumas River breached, and that was that. We suffered water flooding in our basement, costing us over $8,000 and time away from home. At that time, I was suffering from cancer, which was very difficult.” D. from Abbotsford wrote, “I used to live in Sumas Prairie in the flood zone, and the threat of flooding was a constant concern, so we moved to the Bradner area of Abbotsford, out of the flood zone. Our old house was badly damaged in 2021. The Canadian government must pressure the U.S. government to dredge out the Nooksack River to prevent flooding again. That is one of the only solutions, as I see it.” R. from Abbotsford wrote, “Both the 2021 and 2025 floods cut off use of Highway 1 to the interior for a month. I lost access to my cabin at Hope, and what about the promised infrastructure? How come it is not happening? Let's get it done. Let's get it right this time. We can't go on like this.” O. from Abbotsford wrote, “Yes, I saw many affected residents from the floods. We have to find a way to fix this from happening again by all means.” E. from Abbotsford said, “We need the federal government to work constructively on the Sumas River watershed coalition and to work with our American partners to fix this issue. Where is the federal leadership?” B. in Mission wrote, “I lived in Agassiz in 2021, near the fairgrounds. My crawlspace flooded. I had huge personal and material losses. I spent months sorting and paying for things that could not be saved.” J. in Mission wrote, “Infrastructure needs to be built to stop this from happening again. We can't go on.” T. in Abbotsford wrote, “I don't live on the Sumas flood plain, but do live on the hill above it. My lower level floods on occasion when our storm drainage system can't handle the extra water, because it has nowhere to go when the plains flood. When the freeway is flooded, my daughter can't go to work in Chilliwack.” R. in Abbotsford wrote, “Thanks for pushing this, Brad. My friend's family's cattle were heavily impacted by the 2021 floods. There was incredible destruction and loss around Sumas Prairie.” He mentions the cattle, and in fact one of the few things people from outside the region remember is the cows swimming in the water during the floods. G. and P. in Abbotsford wrote, “In addition to being cut off from the rest of Canada by the flooding in 2021, our region had to rely on shipments being rerouted through the U.S., Washington state, and then back into B.C. Given the trade tensions with the U.S. and our country's resolve to become less dependent on the U.S., do we really want to find ourselves in that position again when the flooding reoccurs? Please get the flood mitigation assistance that was promised in November 2021.” S. H. from Abbotsford wrote, “We had to be evacuated in the middle of the night. We had to relocate our livestock. We missed work. Our property was damaged. The Trans-Canada Highway was flooded and closed. There was poor communication on road closures. We lost a lot of livestock due to the flood.” S. in Abbotsford wrote, “While my property was not flooded, my friends had just recovered from the previous flood disaster. To have two floods so close together stinks of neglect and disinterest for the people of the Fraser Valley.” R. in Abbotsford wrote, “The recent flood disrupted my work for most of a week. I head up construction for farmers, fresh mushrooms, these last 12 years. My work stopped because I had no access to gravel on Sumas Mountain. Three of my crew lost a week's worth of work, because all the roads were cut off.” J. in Abbotsford wrote, “I don't live in the flood plain, but a percentage of our city does. It is terribly disruptive when the floods take place. I am only inconvenienced, but there are people in our city fighting for their homes, land and way of life. Do we have to have another fatality for Ottawa to notice? Thank you for your efforts.” D. in Abbotsford wrote, “Again, Brad, you're looking out for your people. Thank you. Not impacted by the flood except by higher prices and groceries and other necessities because freight was held up. The poor farmers affected have been most heartbreaking. We knew the prime minister at the time, Justin Trudeau, would not keep his promise to help. He gave hope in one hand and snatched it up with the other hand. Typical of him. Also, go very hard on SOGI in our schools. God continue to give you strength.” M. in Abbotsford wrote, “I haven't been affected personally, but my uncle was flooded in the 1975 flood. It has only gotten worse in the 1990s and in the 2020s. My dad had a friend who was a diking commissioner in the Nooksack in the nineties. He was hamstrung by bureaucracies there. It was an international problem that affects the local Americans as well. It missed federal government action on both sides of the border. The Nooksack needs dredging, and we need to improve our dikes. I agree. This problem can only be fixed if the federal government gets involved.” P. from Abbotsford is a professor at the university, and she said they had to cancel exams and that the university was shut for a week because of the floods. She encourages the federal government to take leadership and dredge the Nooksack. K. from Mission wrote, “I'm going to be 85 this spring. I have a caring heart. We've got to get this fixed. This is not acceptable.” B. from Abbotsford wrote, “I received your letter, ‘Fix the Flooding Failure, Hold Ottawa Accountable’, in the mail this week.” This was a few months ago. “You asked how the 2021 and most recent flooding have affected our lives. Well, the Sumas Prairie flood was truly an experience for us. After spending the evening of November 15, 2021, and well into the morning moving files from our office into the shop and into the house, we tried to save our daughter's art studio, furniture and artwork, our other daughter's piano studio, located by the back of our garage, and anything we could from the basement by moving it to the main floor. We never expected the water to rise as much as it did. “We moved items and mopped up water for 26 hours straight. By 4:30 a.m. on November 16, we were completely exhausted and cold. We rested until 6:30 a.m., when we heard police telling us to evacuate. In that short time, the water had rushed in and was already four feet deep in the basement. We couldn't reach the breaker panel or turn off the water or gas. We had only minutes to leave. The water continued rising faster. “We waded through dirty, freezing water to reach our truck on the road. The road had disappeared, and the surrounding area looked like we were in the middle of a lake. Water was entering the cab of the truck. We were very fortunate to get out when we did. Trying to drive when no road is visible and avoiding deep farm ditches was extremely challenging. “We headed south along the mountain, driving through the mudslides and downed branches, and made our way to Chilliwack. With the flooding and landslides, it felt like we were in a movie. “Cold and wet, we were instructed to register with emergency evacuation services in Chilliwack. Our two daughters had stayed at their grandparents the night before because they couldn't make it home once flooding began at Whatcom Road. My husband and I ended up in Chilliwack. “Chilliwack became chaotic as people panicked to get gas and food. Gas stations ran out of fuel, and fights were starting because of the long, frantic lineups. We were able to get clothes and food at Superstore since we had left many essentials at home, but later the store closed as shelves were emptied. “Sumas Prairie and Highway No. 1 were closed, as were Highway No. 1 East past the Agassiz exit and Highway 7 due to mudslides. Exhausted and considering sleeping in the back of the truck, we searched for a place to stay, but nothing was available. It was November, and daytime temperatures were around five degrees. Thankfully, my mum made some calls, and we ended up staying with a distant relative. “On Thursday, November 19, we were finally able to head back to Abbotsford via Highway No. 7. It took three hours, but we still couldn't reach our house. Flooding was everywhere, even though the water had receded three feet. “By Sunday, we were able to pull up to our home and assess the damage. Wearing boots, we entered the house and quickly packed what we could from the main and upper floors. The smell permeated everything. Clothing and bedding that could be washed were washed, but it took a lot to remove the odour. We lost all of our office equipment and furniture, the furniture and appliances in our basement and anything we had placed on our shelves, thinking the water wouldn't reach the ceiling. “We lost all our RV, our chickens and both coops, the art studio, the piano studio and four vehicles. Our business trailers were flooded, and we worked with ICBC to have them repaired. “Seeing the damage was tough, but we had to move forward and do the hard work to get back to normal. We gutted, dried out and repaired our shop. We bought new tools and threw out damaged equipment. Our construction company's head office had to be relocated off the property. “With the help of family and friends, the cleanup began. We ended up with six and a half feet of water, contaminated water containing septic waste, manure, chemicals, oils and gas. Anything touched by it had to be thrown out. Our house needed to be rebuilt, so we lived elsewhere for two and a half years. “We are still dealing with the aftermath. Damage to the outbuildings is yet to be repaired because our focus and finances had to go towards the house and shop. Our older farmhouse had water up to the main floorboards, and after sitting in water for almost a week, the mould and structural damage made rebuilding necessary. “Unfortunately, we had no insurance coverage for overland flooding. Intact Insurance had sent us a letter a year earlier stating that due to failing infrastructure, they would no longer cover floods. I tried to get insurance elsewhere for this, but no one would offer it. “The recent flooding only affected our backyard field and ditches.” That's the one last year. “The house was spared this time. My daughter and I were evacuated at 12:30 a.m. but returned in the morning before Vye Road flooded. Our daughter had recently undergone surgery and was still using a hospital bed, so staying elsewhere was impossible. My husband remained at the house. The stress was still there, knowing how easily it could happen again. “One of our neighbours completely emptied their house, appliances and all, fearing a repeat of 2021. We monitored the water constantly to see how quickly the yard was filling. We were still able to reach Chilliwack via back roads but were cut off from Abbotsford due to closures at Vye Road, Whatcom Road and Whatcom Road to Highway No. 1 from our work. “In 2021, when our dike filled, we realized most of the water that flooded our home came from that failure. This time, we watched the direction of the water from the Nooksack, which has flooded before and follows the same path towards Highway No. 1. “As landowners in the Sumas Prairie, it is deeply concerning that so little has been addressed since 2021. Thank you for taking the time to read our story and share our concerns.” C. from Abbotsford wrote, “In 2021, we were greatly impacted by the flood. We lost many of our belongings and animals. We never received any relief funding or even dump fees waived because we were not put on alert. Our house was completely surrounded by water, but because it sits up high enough, we were able to stay. Not once did any first responders or law enforcement ever come to check on us. We continue to flood every winter, but the city refuses to help us in any way.” R. and D. in Mission wrote, “I can't access the Fraser River from the Barrowtown boat launch anymore due to the level of gravel flowing through the Vedder Canal. The Chilliwack Lake watershed was overlogged decades ago but perhaps has recovered by now. However, the canal needs to be dredged. It's got nothing to do with the so-called climate change, as some try to suggest.” I could go on, but those testaments are clear. My constituents have not received the type of federal support they deserve. They have not received the type of flexibility that the government is showing in Bill C-26 and in this programming motion to accomplish its goals. It has not done anything for the Fraser Valley region, which is integral to maintaining Canada's supply chains in 2026. In my next hour, I am going to look a little more closely at what the government has done on housing since it was elected. It starts with the national housing strategy, which came out in 2016 or 2017. The member for Québec Centre wrote a message as the minister of families, children and social development. He stated: It is my great honour and pleasure to present Canada's first ever National Housing Strategy (NHS), an ambitious $40-billion plan to help ensure that Canadians have access to housing that meets their needs and that they can afford. Bringing this Strategy to life has been a priority for the Government of Canada for the past 18 months. We are making historic investments in housing—and planning for transformational change—because we understand the value of home. Safe, affordable housing is a launch-pad for better socio-economic outcomes for our citizens, a more inclusive society where everyone has the opportunity to be well and to succeed, a stronger economy and a cleaner environment. But for too many Canadian families, a decent home is simply not affordable. Across Canada, 1.7 million people are in housing need, living in homes that are inadequate or unaffordable. Another 25,000 Canadians are chronically homeless. This needs to change. Building on investments announced in Budgets 2016 and 2017, [this strategy] signals a meaningful re-engagement by the federal government in housing. It is a key element of our Government's plan to help strengthen the middle class, promote growth for everyone, and lift more Canadians out of poverty. Important learnings emerged from last year’s Let's Talk Housing consultations, and our Strategy is stronger for it. Now the work of implementing these ideas begins. He continued: We have set clear goals for the [national housing strategy], including removing 530,000 Canadian families from housing need and reducing chronic homelessness by half over the next decade. We will track and report on our success, and adapt our approach as needed as the Strategy unfolds. Our primary focus will be on meeting the needs of vulnerable populations, such as women and children fleeing family violence, seniors, Indigenous peoples, people with disabilities, those dealing with mental health and addiction issues, veterans and young adults. The release of the [national housing strategy] marks the beginning of a new era for housing in Canada. We have a Strategy that all Canadians can be proud of and support. I encourage you to become part of this nation-wide effort to ensure that all Canadians have the safe and affordable housing they need and deserve. I consider the member to be an honourable one, but I will note that every metric and group outlined in his introductory letter to the national housing strategy has failed, every single one. Not one thing has been done as they said it would be done when the plan was announced. The first-ever national housing strategy went on: The Government of Canada believes every Canadian deserves a safe and affordable home. Affordable housing is a cornerstone of inclusive communities.... Canada’s first ever National Housing Strategy is a 10-year, $40-billion plan that will give more Canadians a place to call home. Canada’s National Housing Strategy sets ambitious targets to ensure that unprecedented investments and new programming deliver results. This will include a 50% reduction in chronic homelessness, and as many as 530,000 households being taken out of housing need. The National Housing Strategy will result in up to 100,000 new housing units and 300,000 repaired or renewed housing units Through new initiatives like the National Housing Co-Investment Fund and the Canada Community Housing Initiative, the National Housing Strategy will create a new generation of housing in Canada. None of that has taken place. Our plan will promote diverse communities. It will build housing that is sustainable, accessible, mixed-income, and mixed-use. We will build housing that is fully integrated into the community—close to transit, close to work, and close to public services. Expanded and reformed federal homelessness programming, a new Canada Housing Benefit, and a rights-based approach to housing will ensure that the National Housing Strategy prioritizes the most vulnerable Canadians including women and children fleeing [from] violence.... I will note that since this strategy was implemented, violence against women in Canada has more than doubled. Cases of sexual assault and intimate partner violence have skyrocketed under the government. The Liberals said housing would fix it. They were wrong. They misled Canada. They misled our entire nation. The statement continues: The National Housing Strategy is truly a national project, built by and for Canadians. The success of our plan requires collaboration from many partners. The National Housing Strategy invests in the provinces and territories, so all regions can achieve better and more affordable housing. It invests in municipalities, to empower communities to lead the fight against homelessness. It also creates new opportunities for the federal government to innovate through [community] partnerships.... I could go on. Page 5 of the report is about “A vision for housing in Canada”. It reads: Canadians have housing that meets their needs and they can afford. That vision has failed. Affordable housing is a cornerstone of sustainable, inclusive communities and a Canadian economy where we can prosper and thrive. I agree with that. The government has done the opposite. The government notes in its strategy on page 5 that: Housing is more than just a roof over our heads It says: Every Canadian deserves a safe and affordable home I agree. They have not done it. Housing investments must prioritize those most in need, including: women and children fleeing family violence; seniors; Indigenous peoples... I might read, later on, the Auditor General's report on the state of housing on first nations reserves. It is complete failure, again. Housing policy should be grounded in the principles of inclusion, participation, accountability, and non-discrimination I agree, but the government has completely failed on that, too. Housing programs should align with public investments in job creation, skills training, transit, early learning, healthcare, and cultural and recreational infrastructure I wish that were the case. It has not happened. Housing investments should support Canada’s climate change agenda and commitment to accessible communities I agree, but with regard to the impacts of natural disasters and what the government scientists have said about climate change in Canada and in my riding, there was never that alignment or prioritization, as I have outlined in the last hour. That is another big fail. Communities should be empowered to develop and implement local solutions to housing challenges I agree. I do not think it is happening, though. Page 6 of the strategy outlines some targets, including “530,000 households removed from housing need”, “385,000 community housing units protected and another 50,000 units created through an expansion of community housing”, a “50% reduction in estimated number of chronically homeless shelter users”, “300,000 existing housing units repaired and renewed”, “100,000 new housing units created” and “300,000 households provided with affordability support through the Canada Housing Benefit”. I do not think they have succeeded in any of those metrics. On page 7, it says the $40-billion initial investment, which has since doubled, will be a “Once-in-a-Generation Joint Investment”. I find it sad that the government has spent so much money and has so little to show for what it said it wanted to do. In chapter 1, the strategy outlines that: Housing Rights Are Human Rights Canadians deserve safe and affordable housing. That is why the federal government is taking these additional steps to progressively implement the right of every Canadian to access adequate housing. Our plan is grounded in the principles of inclusion, accountability, participation and non-discrimination.... None of that has taken place. The plan talks about new legislation, the National Housing Strategy Act, which I will get to in just a minute, and a new federal housing advocate. I will note, on a positive note, that at least the federal housing advocate has been willing to call out the government accordingly and hold it to account for some of its failures, like the 1,000-year statistic I gave earlier, which outlines that the plan is a complete failure. The plan created a new national housing council, new initiatives, new public campaigns, new legislation and all sorts of new agencies and councils. None of it has made a difference. None of the metrics were met. Chapter 2 talks about “Federal Re-Engagement Through the National Housing Co-Investment Fund”. I do not know what to say. It talked about 60,000 new units and new shelter spaces. Poverty in Canada has grown at such an exponential rate under the government over the last 10 years that even where the government might have made an incremental improvement, the foundation of our economy, our socio-economic status and the erosion of civil society that we have witnessed over the last 10 years have eroded any good that any of these policies could have completed. While more money was pumped, fewer results were achieved. The plan talks about “Making Federal Lands Available for Affordable Housing”. The government is still talking about that. It still has not done anything. I do not think it has made any measurable difference. The only success we have seen on that is when we removed all federal barriers and granted federal lands to indigenous people, to the outcry of many residents in Vancouver. We have seen massive new housing developments take place. It is only when the federal government is not involved that we see results. Chapter 3 talks about “Maintaining a Resilient Community Housing Sector”. I do not know what that means. I do not think it has made a difference. Chapter 4 talks about “A New Canada Housing Benefit” for low-income people. The government is removing that benefit now. Chapter 5 talks about “Progress Through Partnership: Enhanced Support to Provinces and Territories”. Again, what progress have we seen? The report mentions the same statistics I read at the beginning, over and over again. Chapter 6 talks about “Letting Communities Lead”. I do not know what that means. Chapter 7 is titled “‘Nothing About Us, Without Us’”. Housing starts for first nations have only eroded under the government. Chapter 8 talks about “Evidence-Based Housing: Research, Data and Demonstrations”. They developed a research agenda around their own work. The research, as I will show, shows that the plan was an abysmal failure. Chapter 9 is about “Improving Homeownership Options for Canadians”. In some of the debates, I will talk about how, in conjunction with this plan, the government's solution for that was allowing the Government of Canada to co-invest in mortgages or have a portion of Canadians' mortgages. That plan failed drastically. Chapter 10 is about “Gender-Based Analysis Plus”. I do not know what that means or what it has done to improve housing affordability in Canada. I hope it has made some improvements but I do not think it has. Chapter 11 talks about the government's journey to reinvest in housing. Great. I could go on. There are more statistics, more failed investments, zero progress to date and a move in the complete opposite direction from the direction the strategy said it would go in. The next document I will quickly take a look at is the National Housing Strategy Act. It was very big legislation for the government at the time. I will outline what it says in the preamble: Whereas housing is essential to the inherent dignity and well-being of the person and to building sustainable and inclusive communities as well as a strong national economy in which the people of Canada can prosper and thrive; Whereas access to affordable housing contributes to achieving beneficial social, economic, health and environmental outcomes; Whereas improved housing outcomes are best achieved through cooperation between governments and civil society as well as the meaningful involvement of local communities; Whereas national goals, timelines and initiatives relating to housing and homelessness are essential to improving the quality of life of the people of Canada, particularly persons in greatest need; Whereas a national housing strategy would support a common vision, key principles and a coordinated approach to achieving...housing outcomes; Whereas a national housing strategy would contribute to meeting the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations; And whereas a national housing strategy would support the progressive realization of the right to adequate housing as recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which Canada is a party; Importantly, the legislation includes a housing policy declaration. In section 4, it reads: It is declared to be the housing policy of the Government of Canada to (a) recognize that the right to adequate housing is a fundamental human right affirmed in international law; (b) recognize that housing is essential to the inherent dignity and well-being of the person and to building sustainable and inclusive communities; (c) support improved housing outcomes for the people of Canada; and (d) further the progressive realization of the right to adequate housing as recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In section 5, under “National Housing Strategy”, on page 3 of the bill, it states: 5 (1) The Minister must develop and maintain a national housing strategy to further the housing policy, taking into account key principles of a human rights-based approach to housing. Content (2) The National Housing Strategy is to, among other things, (a) set out a long-term vision for housing in Canada that recognizes the importance of housing in achieving social, economic, health and environmental goals; (b) establish national goals relating to housing and homelessness and identify related priorities, initiatives, timelines and desired outcomes; (c) focus on improving housing outcomes for persons in greatest need; and (d) provide for participatory processes to ensure the ongoing inclusion and engagement of civil society, stakeholders, vulnerable groups and persons with lived experience of housing need, as well as those with lived experience of homelessness. The act sets out a national housing council. It states: 6 (1) A council, to be known as the National Housing Council, is established for the purpose of furthering the housing policy...by (a) providing advice to the Minister, on its own initiative or at the request of the Minister, including, among other things, on the effectiveness of the National Housing Strategy This sounds familiar. Is it another bureaucratic body to do the job of the minister. It talks about the membership of the council, which I will not go into, as well as ex officio members and the appointment terms. This was a very common thing under Trudeau. Every legislation had a corresponding council. The legislation created a federal housing advocate on page 6, with specific duties to do the following: (a) monitor the implementation of the housing policy and assess its impact on persons who are members of vulnerable groups, persons with lived experience of housing need and persons with lived experience of homelessness; (b) monitor progress in meeting the goals and timelines... (c) analyze and conduct research, as the Advocate sees fit, on systemic housing issues, including barriers... (d) initiate studies, as the Advocate sees fit, into economic, institutional or industry conditions... (e) consult with persons referred to in paragraph (a) and civil society organizations... (f) receive submissions with respect to systemic housing issues; (g) provide advice to the Minister; (h) submit a report to the Minister on the Advocate’s findings...and; (i) participate in the work of the National Housing Council as an ex officio member. The act established a review panel, and it goes on and on about the review panel. It talks about accountability on page 10, which states: The Minister must respond to the annual report of the Federal Housing Advocate. I would be remiss as a member of Parliament to not note that we ask general questions on the state of housing in Canada every day, and we never get clear responses. We hear only that everything is okay and Canada has never had it so good. That is essentially the strategy. During the debates, because this was part of the budget bill in April 2019, many Liberals spoke highly about what they were doing. Jennifer O'Connell, the parliamentary secretary to the minister of finance at the time, talked about how the Liberal approach was going to help young Canadians who “want the chance to work in a good career, buy a home and build a better future for themselves, their families and their communities.” That was never realized. She talked about their approach to housing, and stated: Many Canadians might feel that because of high house prices in some of Canada's largest cities, buying a home is increasingly out of reach. We know that young people especially are being priced out of some house and condo markets. Average home prices today are about eight times larger than the average full-time income of Canadians aged 25 to 34. That is markedly different from a few decades ago, when they were about four times larger. To address the difficulty that young families may be having in buying their first home, through Bill C‑97, budget 2019 proposes a new first‑time home buyer incentive. With this extra help in the shape of a shared equity mortgage through the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Canadians can lower their monthly mortgage payments, making home ownership more affordable. I would note that the government scrapped that program pretty quickly. It was an abysmal failure. She continued: Through budget 2019 and Bill C‑97, our government is also increasing the home buyers' plan withdrawal limit for the first time in a decade. I will admit that was a good policy, but none of the Liberals' measures improved affordability. Budget 2019 talked about job experience and employer-relevant skills. None of that panned out. This is interesting: The parliamentary secretary at the time talked about attracting more foreign students to Canada by promoting Canadian educational institutions as high-caliber places to study. One of the biggest and most negative impacts on housing affordability in Canada has been the immigration policies of the current government, where demand completely outstrips supply due to unfettered immigration targets. Just a few years ago, the members opposite praised the government for increasing those numbers. What a short-sighted policy idea that was. Maryam Monsef, in May 2019, talked about more funding in budget 2019: ...we took our commitment to housing even further. We are investing an additional $10 billion in the rental construction financing initiative, which will help people who rely on rental and social housing to find more housing opportunities. We have introduced the first-time homebuyer incentive, which will help more Canadians achieve the dream of owning a home. Thanks to these and other investments, the national housing strategy is now a...$55-billion plan, and we are seeing the fruits of our commitment in new and renewed housing units across the country. Next year, the Canada housing benefit will come into effect. This is an additional $2,500 a year for low-income Canadians. It is a portable fund that will follow them wherever they choose to live to ensure they have greater access to affordable housing. She talked about the National Housing Strategy Act, which I just read from and which: ...would create a national housing council supported by CMHC, which will act as a focal point for housing policy discussions on the national housing strategy and will advise the minister on how to improve housing outcomes. With [these] amendments, we are empowering the national housing council with even more freedom to support the federal housing advocate and to report on the findings to the minister responsible. She talked about being very proud of the housing investments and about upholding the rights of Canadians. The member for Surrey Centre also spoke about the 2019 budget with respect to housing. He stated: By listening to the needs of Canadians and encouraging dialogue, I am proud to say this government has continued its commitment to improving housing affordability in this country, and this is exemplified in budget 2019.... The government is...committed to working in partnership with the province and the municipality to ensure a tri-levelled affordable housing strategy for Surrey residents. In conjunction with British Columbia's affordable...plan and Surrey's affordable housing strategy, the government's new homeowner incentive is a proactive measure to ensure that a future in Surrey is possible for young people and families. He stated in his speech: Our goal is to cut chronic homelessness in half, remove 530,000 families from housing need and invest in the construction of up to 100,000 new homes. However, our government knows that these changes cannot, unfortunately, take place overnight. This is why our government has introduced new measures in budget 2019 to help relieve the pressures on Canadians.... We will continue working hard to ensure that...middle-class Canadians [can afford a home, that] home ownership is not a pipe dream, but rather, an achievable goal. The then parliamentary secretary to the Minister of International Development talked about this, saying: Today in Canada, especially where my constituents live in Brampton West, once affordable properties are now out of reach due to high demand. Therefore, in budget 2016 and in budget 2017, we established Canada's first-ever housing strategy that would invest $40 billion over 10 years to build and repair affordable housing units. This gives future homeowners greater options when looking at the housing market and makes housing accessible to more people than ever before. In budget 2019, we are taking another step to support first-time homebuyers, including new immigrant families in Brampton West. To help make home ownership more affordable for first-time homebuyers, budget 2019 introduces the first-time homebuyer incentive. This incentive would allow eligible first-time homebuyers, who have the minimum down payment of an insured mortgage, to finance a portion of their home purchase through a shared equity mortgage with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. Later in her speech, she says: It is unfortunate that the provincial government in Ontario is impeding the flow of federal dollars to our municipalities. This has been having a tremendous effect in my community in Brampton. We are working directly with our municipalities to ensure that essential projects move forward. I am proud to be part of a government that is working with municipalities on behalf of Canadians and delivering for them. Brampton will be receiving close to $50 million through this fund so that it can invest in services that Bramptonians rely on most, such as public transportation, recreation centres and our parks. I could go on. The member for Humber River—Black Creek, on June 4, 2019, said: We are not just talking about the homeless. We are talking about seniors who cannot sell their houses because they have nowhere to go, and they are struggling as it is. There are a lot of people who are struggling and looking for housing. I hope that the way we are doing it, under our new national housing strategy, is going to help decrease the number of homeless people. More important, it is to help people find alternative forms of housing compared to what they currently have. The member for Humber River—Black Creek went on to prop up the first-time homebuyers incentive. She said that it: will certainly help a lot of young people in their mid-thirties who are having significant difficulty just getting into the housing market. Once they can get into the housing market and stay employed, they will have lots of opportunity to build equity in that house and then can later on move into a larger house as their family grows. The then parliamentary secretary to the minister of finance, a member from Quebec, talked about many measures in budget 2019 as well. About Bill C-97, he said: In concrete terms, it will require the federal government to give priority to the housing needs of the most vulnerable Canadians. The government will also be required to report back to Parliament on the progress made in implementing the strategy and in achieving the desired results with respect to housing. These targets, such as cutting homelessness in half in this country and building 100,000 new units, as well as repairing and renovating another 300,000, will make a real difference in the lives of many Canadians.... I think it is time for the federal government to take responsibility for housing and make a bold, ambitious comeback. That is what the national housing strategy does. The Liberals' housing agenda, first articulated in 2017 through the national housing strategy, was framed as a historic and transformational shift in federal policy. The quotes I just outlined from the budget debate in 2019 reinforce that. The former minister from the Quebec region presented the strategy as a long-overdue correction to decades of federal withdrawal, promising not only significant new investment, but a reorientation of housing policy toward affordable, equitable and measurable outcomes. Housing was to be treated as a human right. Vulnerable Canadians would be prioritized, and hundreds of thousands of households would be lifted out of housing need. The rhetoric was expansive and ambitious, setting expectations for systemic change rather than incremental improvement. However, when these promises are compared to the current trajectory of housing policy, particularly as outlined in the 2025 report by the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, a significant gap emerges between what was promised and what is now being delivered. One of the most striking divergences lies in the trajectory of federal spending. The national housing strategy was built on the premise of sustained, long-term federal investment. In 2017, the government emphasized that consistent funding over a decade would provide stability, enable planning and ultimately improve affordability outcomes, yet according to the PBO's 2025 analysis, federal housing spending is not being sustained. It is actually declining sharply. Planned spending falls from $9.8 billion in 2025-26 to just $4.3 billion by 2028-29. It is almost as if the government is afraid to admit the fact that its strategy was not working. The implication is clear: Despite earlier commitments to long-term leadership, the federal role in housing is set to diminish precisely when demand for intervention still remains incredibly high. This decline in spending is closely tied to the exploration of key programs under the national housing strategy. This creates some structural problems. The policy architecture that supported the government's original affordability goals is being dismantled faster than a new policy can be approached. As a result, the overall footprint of federal housing policy is changing without direction. The flagship initiative under budget 2025, Build Canada Homes, exemplifies this shift. Rather than providing immediate relief to households struggling without housing costs, it focuses on financing construction, developing assets and encouraging new housing supply over time. In principle, increasing housing supply is an essential component of any housing strategy. However, the effectiveness of the shift depends on both the scale and the timing of the resulting construction. On both counts, the PBO's assessment raises concerns. The report estimates that Building Canada Homes will generate approximately 26,000 new housing units over a five‑year period. While this is not insignificant in absolute terms, it is modest relative to the scale of housing shortages. The PBO notes that this output would increase housing completions by only 2.1% and addresses just 3.7% of the projected housing gap. These figures underscore a key limitation: The program's contribution to overall supply is incremental rather than transformative. The government has also stated an ambitious goal of doubling the pace of housing construction, yet the PBO explicitly states that no detailed plan has been provided to achieve these objectives. This disconnect between stated targets and concrete policy mechanisms weakens the credibility of the government's approach and raises questions about its capacity to deliver meaningful results. The limited scale of new supply is further compounded by issues related to affordability targeting. Of the 26,000 units expected to be created under Building Canada Homes, only about 13% are projected to be affordable for low-income households. This represents a relatively small contribution in the context where millions of Canadians face affordability challenges. More concerning is the definition of affordability itself. The PBO highlights that some units classified as affordable under the program may have rents significantly higher than historical market benchmarks. For example, illustrative calculations suggest that rents deemed affordable for median-income households could be substantially higher than the national median market rent observed in previous years. This raises a critical concern: The policy risks conflating affordability with relative pricing metrics that does not reflect the lived reality of low- and moderate-income households. In effect, units may be labelled as affordable without being meaningfully accessible to those most in need. Another important aspect of the current policy direction is the trade-off between short-term support and long-term investment. By shifting resources toward capital development, the government is prioritizing supply over immediate affordability, which warrants more discussion. However, this does create a timing mismatch. Housing construction takes years to complete, and its impact on prices and rents is gradual. In contrast, affordability challenges are immediate and acute for many households. Renters facing high costs today cannot wait for long-term supply responses necessarily to materialize. It is something to consider. The reduction or expiration of direct supports, many have argued, leaves a gap in the policy framework. The PBO explicitly notes that the addition of new units will only partially offset the decline in overall affordability support. Compounding these issues are plan reductions in funding from the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, the federal agency responsible for administering many housing programs. The report identifies $2.4 billion in cuts to CMHC funding over several years. This raises concerns about the system's capacity to deliver effective housing support. Reductions in funding for programs, administration, financing tools and sector development can weaken the overall effectiveness of housing policy. Taken together, these trends point to a broader pattern, a contraction in federal housing policy combined with a reorientation toward long-term supply measures. That is not all bad, but the national housing strategy is still the official policy of the government on the books and should be taken in the context of these changed policy metrics. When viewed in the context of the government's original promises, the divergence becomes even more pronounced. In 2017, the Liberals committed to prioritizing vulnerable Canadians. These commitments implied not only increased spending but also a sustained focus on outcomes for those most affected by the housing crisis. By 2026, however, the policy framework appears to be moving away from these priorities. This does not mean that all elements of the current approach are without merit. Investments in housing supply are necessary, and efforts to modernize construction methods or leverage public land can contribute to long-term improvements. However, the scale and design of these initiatives are critical. As the PBO analysis shows, the current measures are insufficient to address the magnitude of Canada's housing challenges. Ultimately, the gap between promise and reality reflects a deeper issue in policy design. I think that warrants us to look at some of the PBO reports that have been issued by the Parliamentary Budget Officer on federal program spending on housing affordability. The first one was on June 18, 2019. The executive summary, on page 1, states: Canada’s 2017 National Housing Strategy...provided new funding for housing affordability programs over its ten-year term from 2018-19 to 2027-28. Taking into account existing and subsequent commitments, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) plans to spend an average of $2.8 billion/year on assisted housing programs over the [ten years] of the NHS. This represents a $0.4 billion/year (15%) increase in nominal spending over the 10-year historical average. Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) plans to spend $225 million/year on homelessness programs, which represents a $86 million/year (62%) increase in nominal spending over the five-year historical average. In the overall allocation of funding between CMHC’s core responsibilities, there is a $325 million/year (14%) reduction in funding for Assistance for Housing Needs programs intended to help low-income households compared with the 10-year historical average. Within the Assistance for Housing Need portfolio, there is a $167 million/year (12%) reduction in funding for transfers to the provinces and territories and a $175 million/year (30%) reduction in funding for federal community housing. These reductions are partially offset by $200 million/year in new spending on rent subsidies. The decline in funding for Assistance for Housing Needs programs is offset, in terms of aggregate spending, by a $664 million/year increase in funding for Financing for Housing programs which are not necessarily targeted to low-income households. It is not clear that the National Housing Strategy will reduce the prevalence of housing need relative to 2017 levels. Overall, Canada’s National Housing Strategy largely maintains current funding levels for current activities and slightly reduces targeted funding for households in core housing need. CMHC’s assumptions regarding the impact of NHS outputs on housing need do not reflect the likely impact of those programs on the prevalence of housing need. From chapter 1, the introduction, under “Purpose of Report”: This report is intended to help parliamentarians understand federal spending on affordable housing and the results that spending is likely to achieve. [The] report is undertaken under the Parliamentary Budget Officers’ mandate to prepare reports concerning the government’s budget and estimates. It was also undertaken under the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s mandate to estimate the financial cost of a proposal over which Parliament has jurisdiction upon requests from a parliamentarian. In this case, a Member of Parliament requested an estimate of the incremental [financing] costs arising from Canada’s National Housing Strategy and the cost to achieve the targets of that strategy. Then, under “Scope of Report”, it states: The National Housing Strategy was announced in Budget 2017 and elaborated upon in a subsequent policy document. This is something I have already read. It was presented as an “ambitious $40-billion plan to help ensure that Canadians have access to housing that meets their needs and that they can afford” by making “unprecedented investments” in housing. The National Housing Strategy Act, found in clause 313 of the 2019 Budget Implementation Act...would require the government to maintain similar strategies and national goals. The National Housing Strategy focuses on program expenditures by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) and Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). CMHC administers most program expenditures relating to housing affordability, while ESDC provides transfers to communities and service providers to help address homelessness. The focus of this report is direct federal expenditures by these two organizations outlined in the Strategy. This report does not include federal tax expenditures. Details regarding federal tax expenditures related to housing can be found in the Department of Finance’s Report on Federal Tax Expenditures. Expenditures by Indigenous Services Canada and Crown Indigenous-Relations and Northern Affairs Canada are not covered in this report. Expenditures of Infrastructure Canada were not examined since it does not provide significant funding for housing Chapter 2 is called “How Much Does Canada Spend on Housing Affordability?” It states: From 2008-09 to 2017-18, CMHC spent [on] average...$2.4 billion/year on the activities now included in its “Assisted Housing” business segment. From 2018 to 2027-28, CMHC plans to spend $2.8 billion/year on these same activities. Under “National Housing Strategy Breakdown”, the chapter continues: As noted previously, the National Housing Strategy was marketed as a “$40- billion plan” or as a “$40-billion federal investment”. In reality, the Strategy committed...$16.1 billion in new federal planned spending.... As shown in Figure 2-4— This is on page 6 of the 2019 “Federal Program Spending on Housing Affordability” report by the Parliamentary Budget Officer. —the “$40 billion” headline commitment in the National Housing Strategy policy document includes...loans..., new loans..., existing planned spending...and required Provincial‑Territorial cost matching.... Together with the $16.1 billion in new planned spending, this exceeds the “$40 billion” headline commitment. A full breakdown is attached as Appendix A.... CMHC’s total planned spending from 2018‑19 to 2027‑28 is $27.9 billion. As we will note in future reports, it has gone up significantly since then, but in the interest of time, and having so many of these reports to get to, I am going to jump ahead to some of the findings they found in 2019. Under “What will the [national housing strategy] achieve?”, the report states: The primary outcome target of the National Housing Strategy is “530,000 households removed from housing need” or “up to 50% reduction in the housing need of renters.” However, it is not clear that the National Housing Strategy will reduce the prevalence of housing need relative to 2017 levels. As shown above, the [national housing strategy] largely maintains current funding levels for current activities in nominal term and slightly reduces targeted funding for households in core housing need. Furthermore, CMHC’s assumptions regarding the impact of [the national housing strategy] outputs on housing need [to] reflect the likely impact of those programs on the prevalence of housing need. This is something the report aptly does. On to the report “Federal Program Spending on Housing Affordability in 2021”, this is a continuation of the review of the Parliamentary Budget Officer's assessment of the national housing strategy. It reads: The Government of Canada’s current plan to address housing affordability is the 2017 National Housing Strategy (NHS), which runs from 2018‑19 to 2027‑28. This plan is primarily administered by Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) and Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). These department’s planned spending under the National Housing Strategy is $3.7 billion each year. As we have noted, it has gone up from $2.8 billion in the 2019 examination already. Average planned spending is driven up by time-limited programs implemented in response to COVID‑19, like the Rapid Housing Initiative. Of the $3.7 billion per year in average planned spending, $221 million per year...is dedicated to indigenous housing in urban, rural and northern areas. Since [the] 2019 report...Canada’s federal government has allocated $672 million per year in additional funding to address housing...and homelessness. The report continues: First, despite the increase in overall spending, funding for CMHC’s assistance for housing need programs intended to help low‑income households increased only by $192 million per year...in nominal terms, which represents a 15% decline in the real purchasing power of federal spending. Second, a significant portion of the community housing supported under CMHC’s bilateral agreements with provinces reached the end of their operating agreements. This caused a [42%] reduction in the number of low-income community housing units supported under bilateral agreements between 2015 and the baseline established by CMHC’s new bilateral agreements. These were outlined in the National Housing Strategy Act. Third, CMHC’s capital contribution programs have faced implementation delays. Over the first three years of Canada’s National Housing Strategy, CMHC spent less than half the funding allocated for two key initiatives, the National Housing Co-Investment Fund and Rental Construction Financing Initiative. As of 30 October 2020, CMHC had made financial commitments towards the creation of 4,270 units of affordable housing committing [on] average [a] maximum of 52% of median market rent under the National Housing Co-Investment Fund. CMHC had made financial commitments towards the creation of 7,960 units of affordable housing committing to charge an average maximum of 72% of 30% of median household income under the Rental Construction Financing Initiative.... Finally, we project that in the absence of additional spending the number of households in housing need would have increased to approximately 1.8 million households with a $9.3 billion aggregate affordability gap by 2025‑26. Over the period of 2021 to 2025, incremental CMHC spending averages 16% of the projected affordability gap and about $63/month per household in housing need. I am going to go on to the 2024 report because I have not even gotten to my analysis yet, after I read all of these reports last night, and that is the most important part. In 2024, the Parliamentary Budget Officer highlights: Spending on programs to address housing affordability averages $6.1 billion...over the term of Canada’s 10‑year National Housing Strategy (NHS). This is a massive increase, we will note, from the 2021 numbers. This represents a 50% increase in the purchasing power of federal spending compared with the prior 10 years. Additional [housing] program spending has been primarily allocated to the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporations’ Financing for Housing programs, which received a $1.3 billion per annum increase in funding. Total spending on housing affordability is estimated to be $17.5 billion annually, with 65% attributable to tax expenditures. After accounting for the impact of all relevant federal policies, [the Parliamentary Budget Officer projects] that 2.6 million households will be in housing need by 2027. This represents an increase of about 926,000 households in core housing need compared to the start of Canada’s [national housing strategy] in 2017. Already, in 2024, we saw that the strategy was not working. An hon. member: Oh, oh! Brad Vis: I am getting there. Do not worry. Mr. Speaker, the report goes on to say: The overall target of Canada’s NHS is to remove 530,000 households from housing need by 2027‑28. After accounting for the impact of all relevant federal policies and economic trends, we estimate that 2.4 million households are currently in core housing need and we project that, by 2027, 2.6 million households will be in core housing need. We project that by 2027, there will be about 926,000 more households in core housing need compared to the start of [the national housing strategy] in 2017. Let us go on to 2025. Then we are going to get to my speech. I have to do my research first. In 2025, in “Build Canada Homes and the Outlook for Housing Programs under Budget 2025”, the Parliamentary Budget Officer highlights that: Federal planned spending on housing programs is set to decline 56 per cent, from $9.8 billion in 2025‑26 to $4.3 billion in 2028‑29 due to the expiry of funding for existing programs and cuts set out in Budget 2025. Within this spending plan, Budget 2025 prioritizes...the construction of new housing through a new federal agency called Build Canada Homes. Build Canada Homes plans to spend $7.3 billion over 2025‑26 to 2029‑30. Here is the cliffhanger: Build Canada Homes should be expected to make a modest contribution toward housing supply and affordability within the broader context of a large decline in support for housing affordability. The report continues: Build Canada Homes is presented as part of the Government’s efforts to double the pace of housing construction over the next decade. That said, the Government has not yet laid out an overall plan to achieve this goal. Ouch. We anticipate that the contribution of Build Canada Homes will likely be modest and estimate that the program will add about 26,000 units over five years, representing a 2.1 per cent increase in housing completions relative to our baseline projection. Build Canada Homes has sufficient funding to create approximately 13,000...units of housing affordable for low‑income households. However, this occurs within a context of declining spending and a shift away from immediate affordability supports such as the Canada Housing Benefit and support for existing social housing. Let us walk through this and break down all of this important information because that was a lot of data. It even got me sweating, it was so suspenseful. I want to walk through not just what the government promised on housing but what the evidence shows. This is now a question not only of policy performance but of whether the government is delivering on its own law, the national housing strategy, and ambition in policy. As I have reiterated numerous times throughout my remarks this morning, the government promised to remove 530,000 households from housing need, cut housing need in half, create 100,000 new housing units, repair or renew 300,000 existing units, protect 385,000 community housing units and reduce chronic homelessness by 50%, a suite of commitments that the government presented as comprehensive, time‑bound and transformational under the national housing strategy in 2017. It committed to cutting housing need in half. These were not small commitments. They, in the government's own words, were meant to be transformational. However, the Parliamentary Budget Officer made very clear early on that outcomes were already falling far short. As early as the first major PBO assessments of the national housing strategy, the evidence showed that the scale of program impacts was insufficient relative to the need, as the member from Winnipeg will note in my disposition of the 2019 report. Even before recent population pressures and interest rate shocks, by 2021, only a few years into its implementation, the PBO was already warning that the net reduction in core housing need was modest and that federal interventions were not on track to meeting stated targets. In other words, the warning signs were visible well before the current crisis we find ourselves in today. The strategy was underscaled from the outset, heavily relying on slow-moving capital programs and incapable of delivering the rapid affordability improvements the government promised. Rather than correcting course when this evidence emerged, the government largely stayed on the path, allowing a predictable gap between ambition and outcomes to widen year after year. The net reduction in core housing need is limited relative to the scale of the problem. That is what the Parliamentary Budget Officer stated in the 2021 analysis report. This was the first clue that something fundamental was not working, because when a plan is described as transformative, but its outcomes are described as limited, there is already a gap between promise and performance. My second point is on the National Housing Strategy Act and ambition in law. It is also important to situate this legal framework in the context of the scale of the federal investment that accompanied it. When the national housing strategy was launched, it was presented as a $40-billion plan. Over time, that figure was repeatedly increased and reframed as over $70 billion in federal commitments across grants, loans, financing tools and program spending. I believe that as of last night, it is over $80 billion in commitments. Parliament was told that this level of investment, combined with a rights-based legislative framework, as I outlined in my review of the act, would fundamentally change housing outcomes in Canada. The act was therefore never intended to operate in isolation from funding. It was meant to discipline and guide very large public expenditures toward measurable outcomes. Indeed, all of the speeches I read from concerning Bill C-97 in the 2019 debates reinforced that very point. In other words, the bargain was clear: unprecedented federal investment in exchange for clear goals, timelines, accountability and a focus on those in greatest need. That is why the failure to meet outcomes is so consequential. After years and years of record spending, program expansion and administrative growth, the evidence shows worsening housing needs rather than the progressive improvement the government labelled in its original housing strategy, as I outlined. This context matters when evaluating the current policy choices before us and this programming motion today. Bill C-26 and budget 2025 do not emerge in a vacuum. They follow a decade of escalating financial commitments that have not delivered the promised results. When the government seeks additional funds through ad hoc legislation while simultaneously reducing support under the existing strategy, it is not because housing lacked funding in the past. It is because large-scale funding, absent structural reform and accountability, has not translated into affordability or adequate supply. Seen this way, the issue before Parliament is not whether more money should be spent, but whether spending is being governed by a framework that actually works. The National Housing Strategy Act was supposed to be that framework. The fact that the government is now bypassing it after committing tens of billions of dollars without achieving its objectives underscores the depth of the policy failure we are confronting. However, this is not just a policy story. As I outlined earlier today, in 2019, Parliament passed the National Housing Strategy Act, and that changed everything because it legally requires the government, in section 5, to set out national goals, timelines and desired outcomes, and “focus on improving housing outcomes for persons in greatest need”. At its core, the act establishes not only a statement of principle, but a framework for action and accountability that is directly relevant to the government's current legislative choices, including Bill C-26. This is where the government's position becomes most revealing. The National Housing Strategy Act was designed to ensure that federal housing policy is guided by outcomes, not announcements: clear goals and timelines, a focus on those in greatest need and mechanisms to measure whether progress is actually being made. New spending under that framework is supposed to advance those objectives and be evaluated against them. Bill C-26 departs from that logic. Rather than strengthening or reforming the national housing strategy to correct its glaring shortcomings and complete failure, the government is proposing a parallel track, authorizing significant new payments for housing supply without anchoring that spending to the strategy's target or the act's obligations. There is no requirement in Bill C-26 to demonstrate how funds would reduce core housing need, no binding affordability thresholds and no alignment with the act's statutory focus on households in greatest need. In effect, the bill asks Parliament to approve new money while suspending the very accountability framework that the Liberal government put in place in 2019. That choice matters. If the strategy and the act were working, new resources would logically flow through them, reinforced by tighter targets and clearer accountability. Instead, Bill C-26 would bypass that framework altogether. This is not an accident. It reflects a tacit recognition that the existing approach cannot deliver outcomes it promised. However, rather than acknowledging that failure and proposing a redesigned strategy, the government is seeking flexibility without accountability, with more money now and fewer questions later. This approach risks repeating the same mistakes at greater cost. Untied spending may move dollars, but without discipline and without parliamentary accountability, it does not guarantee homes that are affordable, nor the intended objectives of the minister. Bill C-26 therefore represents not a course correction, but an institutional workaround, one that would allow the government to claim action on housing while avoiding a candid reckoning with why its flagship strategies have fallen apart. The National Housing Strategy Act establishes the right to adequate housing as a “fundamental human right”. These are not suggestions. They are regulatory obligations, which means that we must evaluate this policy not just politically but legally. Is it improving outcomes? Is it prioritizing Canadians most in need who are going to their local food bank and working two jobs? Is it moving things forward, as the principle that the Liberals outlined of progressive realization requires? No. Let us turn to the data we reviewed in the 2019, 2021, 2024 and 2025 Parliamentary Budget Officer reports that I outlined earlier. The Parliamentary Budget Officer told us that housing need rose to 2.6 million households in 2024, yet only 78,000 households have been removed from need in that same 2024 report. This is not a small gap. This is a complete collapse in deliverology. The Liberals used to love talking about deliverology. That is a shortfall of more than 450,000 households. Barely one in seven who were promised relief will actually receive it. Critically, the PBO concludes that housing need is expected to increase over the projected period despite program spending. It is very clear. Program spending is not working. What the government campaigned on in the last election is not working. This is perhaps the most damning finding in my entire analysis today, because it tells us that even after billions of dollars and years of programs, the system is not improving; it is deteriorating. Public, independent evidence makes clear that this deterioration is occurring despite the creation of a large federal housing bureaucracy and tens of billions of dollars in announced spending. The Parliamentary Budget Officer is repeatedly showing us that while administrative structures, programs and reporting requirements have expanded, the measurable outcomes that matter, such as reductions in housing need, improved affordability and faster supply delivery, have not followed. In effect, the federal government has built a complex policy and administrative architecture, but that architecture has not translated into results on the ground. Rising housing need, declining affordability and missed targets demonstrate that process has outpaced performance and that the scale of bureaucracy and spending alone has not been sufficient to meet the Liberal government's stated objectives. Let us look at some of the mortgage delinquency rates that are on the rise. Mortgage delinquencies have increased significantly after nearly a decade of Liberal housing policy. CMHC reported in May 2026 that the national 90‑plus day mortgage delinquency rate rose to 0.2% in quarter four of 2025, up from 0.21% a year earlier. According to a 2026 Equifax report, the rate of delinquencies in Ontario sat at about 0.3% in the first quarter of this year, a jump of 52% year over year. In B.C., the number jumped 36% to 0.25%. Rebecca Oakes, vice‑president of advanced analytics at Equifax Canada, said, “When we look kind of at the mortgage trend, it is just a really good indication of the severity of financial stress that’s happening in a region.” Ontario is experiencing record stress. The housing crisis is no longer even about affordability alone. It is becoming a mortgage payment crisis. Equifax reported that mortgage delinquencies were up 52% year over year in Ontario during quarter one of 2026. In Toronto, mortgage delinquency rates increased by approximately 58% year over year. Data from CMHC showed that around 0.21% of homeowners in Hamilton had not made a full mortgage payment in at least three months as of late 2025, representing a 425% increase in that city's mortgage delinquency rate from mid-2022. Homeowners are carrying larger and larger debts. When borrowers fall behind today, they are falling behind on much larger mortgages. The average delinquent mortgage balance reached approximately $355,000 in quarter one of 2026, a 13.2% increase from a year earlier. Total consumer debt reached $2.66 trillion nationally. Mortgage delinquencies are often the final stage of household financial distress. The Bank of Canada found that households heading towards mortgage delinquency typically increase credit card utilization roughly two years beforehand, begin missing consumer credit payments one or two years beforehand and experience rapidly worsening financial conditions in the six months leading up to mortgage delinquency. Canada needs more homes, but the 2025 National Building Code risks making homes more expensive to build. The Canadian Home Builders' Association argues that housing affordability and supply are already in crisis and that the code changes should be evidence-based, cost-effective and implementable at scale. The CHBA has criticized the 2025 codes for insufficient consideration of their cumulative cost impacts. The costs are so significant that in a February 2026 open letter to the Prime Minister, the Canadian Home Builders' Association calls for an immediate pause to that regulatory approach. The CHBA has cited federal impact analysis showing that high-energy performance tiers could increase construction costs by more than $40,000 per home. In total, the CHBA estimates that the 2025 National Building Code could add up to $100,000 in costs to a new unit. Every policy should be tested against one question: Will it build more homes? Governments should be focused on removing barriers to construction and increasing supply. The association has warned that many regulatory responses to housing and climate objectives ultimately increase costs and reduce housing production. Let me expand on my speech on budget 2025 regarding less support, not more. One might assume that worsening outcomes could be addressed simply by expanding funding, but the evidence shows that money alone is not the binding constraint. The problem is not a lack of announcements or headline dollars. It is that the underlying policy framework has failed to translate resources into results. Structural barriers, slow approvals and misaligned incentives such as those outlined by the Canadian Home Builders' Association outline that very fact. Delayed project delivery, weak targeting and an overreliance on long-term capital programs have meant that additional funding has not produced proportional investments in affordability or a reduction in housing need. However, the PBO shows something more important: Outcomes have continued to worsen, not because funding was insufficient but because the government's approach failed to address structural constraints that determine whether homes actually get built and become affordable. Spending's falling 56% is a signal that the government itself is implicitly acknowledging that simply layering additional funding onto the existing approach has not delivered results. Rather than openly reassessing the strategy and admitting that its core design has failed, the government appears to be quietly pulling back, reducing funding while maintaining the same policy framework. This halfway acknowledgement, though, stops short of the full consideration the evidence supports, which is that the approach itself, not just its funding level, has failed to meet its objectives. I encourage everyone to look at the highlights on page 1 of the Parliamentary Budget Officer's outlook for housing programs under budget 2025. Federal plan spending on housing programs, as I just noted, is set to decline 56%, a decline that reflects more than a fiscal choice. It follows years in which the government failed to meet the core objectives it set for itself under both the national housing strategy and the strategy act. Rather than acknowledging that its approach has delivered neither the promised reduction in housing need nor improvements in affordability, the government is scaling back federal supports while leaving the underlying strategy largely intact, effectively retreating from its own commitments without admitting its failure. Let us be clear. Housing need continues to rise in Canada. Targets are being missed, and spending is being cut. This is not an adjustment. It is a quiet retreat from objectives the government has failed to meet under both the national housing strategy and the National Housing Strategy Act, an implicit acknowledgement that the approach has not worked, without the candour to admit failure or undertake a genuine course correction. If I had another couple of hours today, I would probably delve into some of the comments made by the Minister of Infrastructure and Housing on his new approach and the new bureaucracies the government is covering. I just do not have enough time to get through all that in the time I have today. I will talk about the supply strategy and Build Canada Homes for a bit. The government's response is to emphasize supply, to build more homes and to accelerate construction, but the PBO even offers a reality check where Conservatives and Liberals might agree on improving supply: “[Build Canada Homes] should be expected to make a modest contribution towards housing supply and affordability.” As I asked earlier when I read that report, what does “modest” mean in practice? It would be about 26,000 units over five years, a scale of delivery that underscores the failure of the government's current approach. Put plainly, this represents roughly 5,000 units per year nationwide, at a time when Canada is adding hundreds of thousands of new residents annually and facing a huge housing gap measured in hundreds of thousands of units. Even the Parliamentary Budget Officer characterized this contribution as “modest”, estimating it would increase housing completions by only about 2.1%, relative to baseline projections. That is not transformational. It is marginal change at best. When a strategy promises to cut housing need in half but delivers a supply that addresses only a tiny fraction of that projected shortfall, this amounts to an admission that the policy levers being used are inadequate. The result is predictable: Housing needs continue to rise, affordability deteriorates, and the government declares success while the underlying problems worsen. In effect, the federal approach substitutes announcement and program branding for outcomes, producing numbers that are too small, too slow and too poorly targeted to reverse the crisis. According to the government's own independent budget officer's assessment, this level of supply cannot meet its stated objectives, confirming that the current strategy, as designed and funded, is failing to deliver the results Canada was promised. Let us delve a bit more into a structural problem in policy design. The issue is not just scale. It is design. The strategy has shifted toward financing tools and long-term capital programs. That is not all bad, but the PBO warns that “this occurs within a context of declining spending and a shift away from immediate affordability supports”. I mention that in the context, because so many more Canadians are on the verge of being homeless. Homeless numbers are actually rising, while the government said they would do the opposite. The government has failed to prioritize the people who are in greatest need. The National Housing Strategy Act requires a focus on those in greatest need, but the funding structure and approach tell a different story. Funding is being shifted from programs that provide current affordability supports toward capital contributions with benefits over many decades. I hope there are some improvements there. Let us talk about generational impact. The consequences for the government's policy failures on housing are not evenly distributed. Young Canadians are bearing the brunt. They face higher rents, delayed home ownership, delayed family formation, rising debt burdens and other postponed life decisions. Even when new units are built, the PBO cautions, the addition of these units would only partially offset the decline in overall affordability support, so even new supply is not solving the overall affordability crisis so many Canadians face today. It barely offsets worsening conditions. To add to these pressures, there is rapid population growth. Demand has surged. Supply has not kept pace, and policy failed to adjust fast enough. Over the last number of years, there have been historically low vacancy rates, rising rents and increased competition for entry-level housing. This is not an isolated policy failure. It is a system-level imbalance. It is therefore deeply ironic that the government is now taking credit for signs of easing in rental markets in some cities where rents have stabilized or grown more slowly. This change is far more plausibly explained by a reduction in housing demand, not by a sudden success of federal housing policy. Over the past year, the federal government has tightened and reduced inflows of temporary residents, including international students and temporary foreign workers, as it celebrated in the 2019 budget implementation act. That shift has had an immediate and measurable effect on rental demand, particularly in urban markets that absorbed a large number of the new arrivals. Fewer new entrants competing for the same limited stock of rental housing naturally does ease upward pressure on rents. That is basic economics. However, this is not a victory on housing policy, supply or affordability. It does not reflect new homes coming online at scale, faster approvals, lower construction costs or a more functional housing system. It reflects demand-side slowdown caused by changes in immigration and temporary resident policy, not the success of the national housing strategy. Indeed, if the government's housing strategy were working as intended, rent moderation would be driven by increased supply, improved affordability outcomes and lower usage of the food bank, especially for low and moderate-income households, not by reduced population inflows. Claiming credit for lower rent growth under these circumstances risks confusing cause and effect. Slower rent increases caused by the arrival of fewer people does not mean housing has become more affordable. It means pressure has been temporarily relieved by constraining demand. This distinction matters. A housing system that relies on dampening demand rather than expanded supply is not resilient. It does nothing to address the underlying shortage. It does not improve access for Canadians already locked out of the housing market, and it offers no assurances that affordability will be sustained if demand rises again. Without structural reform, faster approval, lower non-construction costs and a regulatory environment that enables builders to deliver housing at scale, any short-term easing driven by reduced demand will prove fragile and reversible. In short, the recent moderation in rents is not evidence that the government's housing strategy is succeeding. It is evidence that the imbalance between supply and demand remains unresolved and that the system responds more quickly to changes in population flows than to years of federal spending and bureaucracy. That reality only reinforces the conclusion that the core problem lies not with the funding levels but with the policy framework that has failed to deliver sufficient housing supply. At the same time, the government has not moved fast enough to improve the economic conditions required for private sector building. Developers have faced rising financing costs, regulatory delays, increased development charges and approval bottlenecks. In fact, I think it is worth reading the February 18, 2026, letter to the Prime Minister. It states: Dear Prime Minister... The Canadian Home Builders’ Association (CHBA) continues to support building code development where it follows principles of clear and convincing policy analysis, where evidence-based decision-making happens in public meetings and where committees emphasize cost-effective (ideally cost-neutral) acceptable solutions that equally solve the climate and housing affordability crises in Canada. We estimate that the new 2025 code will add over $100,000 to the cost of a typical new home...this is completely untenable. To that end, we cannot support the 2025 model codes or their adoption and call for an immediate pause to redo them properly CHBA has become seriously concerned over the last few years with how Canada’s new governance system for national codes and its updated code development process is neither transparent nor evidence-based anymore. These deficiencies are having a direct and negative impact on housing affordability, construction productivity, and the ability of industry stakeholders to contribute meaningfully to effective codes development and implementation while reaching your government’s priorities of additional housing supply and more climate change effective construction. Further to that, by not addressing housing affordability in the national model codes, even though most provinces and territories call it a priority, there may in fact not be harmonization—the very reason model codes exist in the first place—because provinces may rightly reviewed and accepted by the time they are published, which negates harmonization by instead increasing the likelihood of provincial variations or non-adoption. Lack of harmonization at the provincial (and municipal) level is a key barrier to industry productivity. A serious course correction is needed, and thus CHBA is urging the Government of Canada to immediately pause all changes to the National Model Construction Codes, as Australia has done with its code system. With that, and before seeking adoption of the 2025 National Construction Codes by the provinces, CHBA is calling on the government to improve the 2025 codes with the proper lenses of affordability, evidenced-based decision-making, and a view to regulations that will truly lead to the optimized outcomes that must be considered in today’s world. The 2025 codes should be paused, revisited, and re-issued once these issues are addressed, so that provinces can and should actually adopt them, and harmonization can be achieved. Here are our key reasons for pausing all construction code changes and revisiting them with proper focus: Reduced Productivity—The large amount of national priorities and the pace of developing the respective code changes leave insufficient time for proper review, simplification and resolution of outstanding constructability or affordability concerns by those who are most affected—the residential construction industry...and Canadians facing affordability challenges in trying to buy a home. The amount of new code requirements is overwhelming. Changes related to energy, greenhouse gas emissions, radon, and wind/seismic loads add significant costs and delays and will reduce the productivity of the sector, while in many cases not even delivering the right outcomes. Much better approaches to achieve these goals must be found through a revamping of the 2025 code, with timelines and solutions that support affordability. Affordability Ignored—There is no formal requirement or code objective to protect housing affordability... Again, the government's approach is not aligned with its national housing strategy or the National Housing Strategy Act. The letter continues: ...not even a principle for committees developing the national codes. Economic concerns brought forward by the construction industry are being dismissed, and cumulative costs for all changes in the 2025 codes have not been calculated by those developing the code. Ultimately, it is Canadians bearing the brunt of the added cost of these changes. All changes should be properly revisited to look at their individual cost impacts, plus the cumulative cost impacts of the full suite of changes the 2025 code will require on each home. CHBA’s initial analysis of a typical 2500 sq. ft. home estimates increased costs from the 2025 code changes to be $56,364 (see Appendix A ) without any energy efficiency compliance cost. If provinces continue to mandate the progressive energy targets from the 2020 codes from Tier 1 to Tier 5 this would double those costs, bringing full implementation of the 2020 energy targets and 2025 codes to an estimated cost of $113,930 for each home built within the next few years. CHBA’s Housing Market Index shows material costs alone for that same house have gone up $100,000 from 2025. Canada’s housing crisis cannot handle these kinds of increases. A much more reasonable approach is needed. Reduced Transparency—Recent changes to the governance and committee structure have reduced transparency and sidelined industry voices. It would be interesting to see how many members of the Canadian Home Builders' Association are on any of the councils the government created in its National Housing Strategy Act. The letter continues: Decisions are increasingly made behind closed doors, with little rationale published or meaningful engagement with those most affected—Canada’s residential construction sector. The residential construction sector...can no longer be the target of poorly thought-out policies and regulations that take away from building more supply. If all levels of government hope to achieve building 500,000 new homes per year, they need to treat the sector as a partner, and excessive and ill‑conceived regulation is a key barrier to be addressed jointly. The more I read this, the more the concerns outlined by the Canadian Home Builders' Association contradict the community-building partnership clauses of the National Housing Strategy Act. How dare they? The letter continues: Harmonization Failure—Without addressing affordability in national codes, which is a key priority for almost every province and territory, the national codes risk being not adopted, or being modified so much provincially that there isn’t in fact harmonization. To that end, the federal government should change the national code publication process such that provinces and territories have time to review a draft code for a year so they can collectively agree to a set of changes they can then adopt as fully harmonized national code at the time the code is published. Without this change, provinces will continue making their own amendments, which prevents harmonization and risks low adoption of costly changes in the 2025 codes. We are urging the federal government to take action now to avoid further fragmentation across Canada. Fragmented Interpretation—Local interpretation of building codes varies significantly from municipality to municipality—even across the same city sometimes, causing delays and extra costs for the industry. This barrier to more housing faster has not been recognized by governments. As the government continues to reduce inter-provincial trade barriers, it also needs to resolve the fragmented interpretation of building codes that not only vary from province to province but also municipality to municipality. To that end, CHBA recommends a National Code Interpretation Centre be established at the National Research Council to publish code interpretations—provinces can in turn reference those interpretations, making them binding, and helping to end the endless variations on code interpretations that are a major barrier to industry productivity. The roadblocks confronting the residential construction industry, such as rising costs, reduced transparency, and fragmented code interpretation will inevitably hinder the government’s pursuit of doubling housing starts, including affecting the government‑supported housing to be built under the Build Canada Homes initiative. Without urgent reform, these systemic issues will undermine all efforts to deliver housing Canadians can afford on the accelerated timelines needed. Facing very similar challenges, the government of Australia recently paused changes to its National Construction Code until 2029, following a report from its own Productivity Commission. The report found that frequent code changes were slowing housing delivery and increasing costs. The pause is intended to provide stability, reduce red tape, and help the industry focus on building more homes. The parallels between Australia’s housing challenges and Canada’s are extensive, making a similar move for Canada justified and essential. To that end, Canada should follow Australia’s lead and immediately stop the adoption and implementation process of the 2025 National Construction Codes, and assess them, with a plan to only put forth for adopting cost-neutral changes for housing in Part 9 of the 2025 national codes... pause all 2030 code development until critical reforms are made to the development approach, such as restoring transparency, accountability, and meaningful stakeholder engagement within the codes system adding an ex-officio seat for CHBA and other broad sector stakeholders at all CBHCC meetings (including in-camera meetings) to properly inform the development from an industry perspective reinstating a coordination committee dedicated to NBC Part 9 (which deals directly with housing) rather than spreading it across 13 committees with nonresidential construction reducing the priorities for the 2030 code cycles, focusing only on essential, cost-neutral requirements making housing affordability a core principle in code development along with a robust structured process to assess and limit individual-change and cumulative costs for each future code edition establish a National Building Code Interpretation Centre to achieve consistent local application of harmonized national construction codes, and work with the provinces to make published solutions binding. Canada must act quickly to avoid the same problems identified in Australia and ensure our codes system supports safe, affordable, and climate-resilient housing. CHBA remains committed to working with government towards a more effective and inclusive code development process. We would be happy to meet with you and your officials at your earliest convenience to continue this important conversation and inform immediate action. That was written by Kevin Lee. That letter was cc'd to the Minister of Housing and Infrastructure, the minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, the Minister of Internal Trade and minister responsible for One Canadian Economy, and the president of the National Research Council of Canada. It also bears mentioning, reflecting on earlier words in the House of Commons today, that the minister responsible, when demanding $1.7 billion, unchecked, from the federal government, could not have referenced this very important letter outlined to him about what he needed to do to address housing affordability in Canada. It is from the very people the government depends on to build homes in the first place. Getting back to my speech and the failure to enable private sector construction, it is not because builders refuse to build, but because conditions made projects unviable. This point has been repeatedly underscored by the Canadian home builders, and it aligns with the broader demand-side story now being mis-characterized as policy success. Builders have consistently warned that the primary barriers to increasing housing supply are not a lack of willingness or the capacity to build, but an accumulation of policy-driven costs, delays and uncertainty that makes projects financially impossible to proceed. As Mr. Lee outlined in his remarks, just the regulatory additions from 2025 alone add over $100,000 to the cost of a 2,500-square-foot home in Canada. How is that a good thing? We have to also look at these building code requirements in the context of the rental market, which is now showing temporary easing during our reduced population inflows, but where we still need to see more rental construction. In other words, recent moderation in rents does not signal that builders suddenly found projects viable. It signals that demand pressures ease when inflows of international students and temporary workers slow. Builders have been clear that absent faster approvals, lower non‑construction costs and predictable timelines, supply will not respond at scale. Approval timelines stretching into years amplify financing risk. Development charges and levies imposed up front erode feasibility. Repeated redesigns across jurisdictions, as Mr. Lee outlined through the Canadian Home Builders' Association, add cost without adding homes. When these factors combine, projects stall or are cancelled, even as governments point to headline spending or short‑term rent data. Canadian home builders have also cautioned that subsidies layered into this environment cannot compensate for structural barriers. Supply responds to certainty, speed and predictability, not to complex program criteria or untied transfers, as we see in Bill C‑26. Without reforms that fix approvals, fees and coordination across governments, additional spending risks flowing to a narrow set of projects or even, in some cases, sitting unused. The lesson from builders is consistent: Easing rents driven by lower demand is fragile and reversible; durable affordability requires making projects viable so homes actually get built. Canadian home builders have pointed to approval timelines that stretch for years, during which carrying costs accumulate and financing risks rise. Zoning constraints, repeated designs and overlapping municipal, provincial and federal requirements add time and cost without adding homes. Development charges, parkland levies and infrastructure fees, often imposed up front, can represent a significant share of total project costs, particularly for multi-unit and purpose-built rental housing. Builders have been clear that when these charges rise faster than sale prices or rents, projects simply do not proceed. If we look back on the 2019, 2021, 2024 and 2025 housing construction policies outlined by the Parliamentary Budget Officer, we can also draw a correlation between rental construction financing and some of these constraints faced by home builders. While intended to reduce costs and provide affordability for homeowners or renters, those costs, in fact, are so great that government financing is outweighed by the regulatory requirements that have increased the cost of home production in the first place, so financing conditions have compounded these problems. Builders have also emphasized that higher interest rates and tighter lending conditions disproportionately affect construction projects with long approval timelines. When approvals take years, interest rate risks alone can erase already thin margins, especially for rental projects where revenues are capped for affordability expectations. In that environment, even projects that align with public policy goals are delayed or cancelled because they no longer pencil out. Critically, builders have also warned that federal programs layered on top of the system do little to address these fundamentals. Subsidies and incentives cannot compensate for regulatory systems that delay projects or for cost structures that exceed what the market can bear. As builders have repeatedly argued, supply responds to certainty, speed and predictability, not program criteria or slow-moving capital contributions. Without reforms that reduce approval timelines, lower non‑construction costs and align incentives across government, additional funding risks sitting unused or flowing to a limited number of projects rather than unlocking broad‑based supply. In short, the evidence from those who actually build homes reinforces the conclusion reached by the Parliamentary Budget Officer. The housing shortfall is not the result of building reluctance or market failure; it is the result of policy choices that have made building housing increasingly difficult. Until those structural barriers are addressed, no amount of new spending, whether under the national housing strategy or through ad hoc measures, such as Bill C‑26, will deliver the scale of housing supply Canadians urgently need. We now have a law requiring better outcomes, a strategy promising transformation and data showing deterioration. The PBO's conclusion remains: The impact of federal housing programs is limited relative to the scale of need. That is our reality. This is not just a policy failure. It is a failure to meet commitments, targets and statutory obligations. When the government promises to help 530,000 households in need and delivers only 78,000 units, when it plays around with its own budgets for housing and then, through Bill C‑26, asks Parliament to authorize new, untied spending for housing supply without reconnecting that spending to the outcomes, targets and timelines it established itself, it bears further scrutiny in Parliament. Bill C‑26 and the programming motion I am debating right now reveal what Bill C‑26 does not do. It authorizes billions of dollars in additional payments to provinces and territories, but it does so outside the architecture of the national housing strategy. There are no statutory outcome requirements, no ties to reductions in housing need, no clear affordability thresholds and no measurable targets aligned with the act's obligations to focus on those in greatest need. In effect, the government is asking for more money now, while simultaneously retreating from the very framework that was supposed to ensure that money produced results. This suggests a partial acknowledgement by the government that its existing approach is not working, but a willingness to go all the way in admitting failure is beyond any Liberal, in my opinion. Rather than reforming the strategy to fix its structural flaws or aligning new spending with the legal obligations Parliament enacted in 2019, the government appears to be sidestepping the problem. It is shifting away from the strategy through re-funding allocations while pursuing ad hoc spending through Bill C‑26 that is disconnected from its own commitments. This is not coherence; it is fragmentation. If the national housing strategy were working, there would be no need to bypass it. If the act's frameworks were delivering results, new spending would logically flow through it, reinforced by clear targets, timelines and accountability. Instead, we see the opposite: declining support under the strategy, combined with new spending requests that avoid its constraints. That combination strongly suggests the government knows that its current approach has failed but does not want to formally acknowledge that failure or undertake the difficult work to redesign what is necessary to help build affordable homes in Canada. The result that we have today, therefore, is the worst of both worlds. Canadians are told that housing remains a top priority, yet the strategy that was supposed to deliver results is being hollowed out. Parliament is asked to approve new funding, but without the guardrails that ensure effectiveness. The core problems, such as affordability, access to affordable homes for low-income households and the growing gap between need and supply, remain unaddressed. In short, Bill C‑26 does not represent a fix to a failing strategy. It represents a workaround. Workarounds are what governments turn to when they no longer believe their own plan can succeed. The conclusion is unavoidable: The strategy is not working, and Canadians are paying the price. In conclusion, according to the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Canada now has approximately 2.4 million households in core housing need, and that figure is projected to rise to 2.6 million by 2027. That would mean nearly one million more households in core housing need than when the national housing strategy was launched in 2017. The very strategy that was supposed to make housing more affordable has coincided with a dramatic increase in the number of Canadians struggling to find suitable, affordable homes. The Liberals have announced program after program, funding envelope after funding envelope, yet the results continue to move in the wrong direction. The PBO found that in 2023 Canada added approximately 460,000 new households while completing only 242,000 housing units. In other words, household growth vastly outpaced housing construction. The result is exactly what Canadians have experienced: rising prices, rising rents and fewer attainable housing options. The same report estimates that Canada will require an additional 1.3 million housing units by 2030 above current projections simply to close the national housing gap. That means Canada would need, on average, roughly 436,000 completed housing units annually between 2024 and 2030, far beyond current construction levels. For renters, the situation is equally troubling. CMHC reported that affordability remains a major challenge. With turnover rents increasing by 23.5% in 2024, young Canadians, newcomers and working families are finding it increasingly difficult to secure housing they can afford. What is most concerning is not simply the scale of the crisis, but the Liberal government's record. Canadians have heard the promises before. They were promised that the national housing strategy would improve affordability. They were promised that billions of dollars in spending would deliver results, yet the Parliamentary Budget Officer has concluded that housing needs continue to grow despite increased federal spending. Even the government's flagship housing accelerator fund deserves scrutiny. The PBO noted that very little funding was spent in its first year and that many of the housing increases observed in participating jurisdictions may have been driven by initiatives already under way before agreements were signed. Trust is earned through results. After years of soaring home prices, rising rents, growing housing needs and repeated missed targets, Canadians have every reason to question whether the same government that helped this crisis can be trusted to solve it. Canadians do not need more announcements. Mission—Matsqui—Abbotsford does not need more announcements. That is why, in the first hour of my remarks today, I related Bill C-26 to the flexibility the government was showing and the lack of action we have had in the Fraser Valley region. It bears repeating, before I conclude today, that my riding is the confluence of the Canadian Pacific Railway, the National Pacific Railway and the Southern Railway. We have a border crossing. The Government of Canada has chosen the Abbotsford International Airport and an amazing Canadian company, Conair, to build the national firefighting fleet for our entire country. Conair already hosts one of the largest fleets of any aircraft provider in the country. We are using De Havilland aircraft built in Canada to supply that fleet. We have the Trans Mountain pipeline and the Sumas transfer station, which transfers 37% of oil from the Trans Mountain pipeline to the United States. The Enbridge pipeline expansion and the Huntingdon transfer station that the government just approved are in my riding. We have the arterial road connecting British Columbia with the rest of Canada. As I outlined for over an hour in this speech, we have received no federal supports, no flexibility and no accountability from the previous prime minister, who said that he would help us. Even today, High Commissioner Bill Blair said to me the other day, “Yes, we broke the promises we made to you.” It is my responsibility to continue fighting for that and to continue saying in this House that the status quo is not okay, if the Minister of Housing and Infrastructure can come forward with Bill C-26, a two-paragraph bill, to say that he needs $1.7 billion in additional housing funding, after a fund of $80 billion over 10 years has already failed every metric pointed out in the 2019, 2021, 2024 and 2025 Parliamentary Budget Officer reports. Why can the federal government not support Abbotsford? I invite the minister to come to my community in good faith. I have never politicized this issue, because it is about Canada first, about the Government of Canada meeting its export objectives. Those export objectives run through the Fraser Valley. Canada cannot build if the Fraser Valley is not protected. We are also the breadbasket of British Columbia. We are the heartland of dairy farmers, blueberry farmers and immigrants who have built their livelihoods supplying Canada with fresh produce, fresh vegetables and the best agricultural products we can find anywhere in this province, and we need help. I plead with the government to help us. This June, we are launching the review process for the transboundary commission. The Minister of Emergency Management, in good faith, sent the parliamentary secretary to support it after I requested it. I will say that in good faith, and I invite the Minister of Housing and Infrastructure to come and hear what people have said and about the suffering we have gone through. Our only request is to help Canada build, help improve those exports and help Canada meet its objectives. We are in British Columbia. I know many Laurentian elites in Ontario and Quebec see it as just this place where they go on vacation and ski, sail and golf in a single day, but it is more than that. It is the export opportunity to the Asia-Pacific region. It is the future of Canada's economic prosperity and it completely aligns with all of the trade objectives set by the Prime Minister, so again, I plead with the government—
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